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Abstract
The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral
epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification
because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social
contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires
rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in
particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to
understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of
contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts
in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world
moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It
motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this
method through a case study.

1. Introduction
Moral disagreement among people who are culturally or religiously diverse, or who stand to each other
in relations of social inequality, is often intractable. People from widely diverse backgrounds often lack
enough shared values or assumptions to establish intelligible communication, and social inequality
among people makes domination and repression all too easy, even for the well‐intentioned. We are
interested in understanding how people can rationally resolve moral disagreements in situations where
finding shared assumptions may be strained, or when parties to a dispute are unequal in social power
and vulnerability. In this article, we prepare the ground for answering this urgent practical question by
articulating and defending a method for doing moral epistemology designed to improve philosophical
understanding of moral justification under conditions of diversity and inequality.

Much existing philosophical work on moral justification occurs at a very high level of abstraction and
sets quite bold theoretical goals. Many philosophers have assumed that moral justification can be pared
down to a single reasoning practice or set of practices, which can be used to justify moral claims in any
context. They therefore take the mission of moral epistemology to be the discovery or construction of a
single, multipurpose model of moral reasoning. Philosophers have typically pursued this mission using
“armchair” philosophical methods. They imagine what moral reasoning should be like either by
constructing fictitious models of justification or by conceptualizing the logical constraints of moral
reasoning under ideal conditions. In our view, the fruits of this philosophical labor as well as this way of
laboring—that is, of doing moral epistemology—are inadequate for understanding how justified moral
claims can be established in situations marked by cultural diversity and power inequality.
An analogy between medical research and moral epistemology is instructive here to introduce our point.
A drug tested successfully within the controlled conditions of a clinical trial may or may not achieve the
expected health outcome when used in the real world. In the context of real life, it might even prove
harmful, depending on how well or poorly the conditions of real life approximate the conditions of the
trial. However, “the” conditions of real life vary considerably. Clinical trials conducted in the 1990s in the
United States of the HIV drug AZT delivered very promising results in that context, but this same drug
regimen proved ineffective and potentially harmful when introduced to populations in sub‐Saharan
Africa that were struggling with epidemic levels of dehydration, malaria, and malnutrition, as well as a
lack of sufficient health care infrastructure to support the complicated AZT regimen. There are enough
physiological similarities among human beings to predict that when human beings are similarly situated
they are likely to respond similarly to a given medical intervention; however, we are not all similarly
situated. The controlled features of the clinical trial in the United States were designed for a population
situated very differently from many populations in sub‐Saharan Africa, rendering the results of the U.S.
trial inapplicable in the African context.
Similarly, a model of moral justification developed under the controlled conditions of the philosopher's
imagination and relying on his or her acknowledged or unacknowledged assumptions may or may not be
capable of justifying moral claims under the conditions of real life. This may be not because the model
has been applied incorrectly or unfairly but because it has been developed assuming a context with one
set of features and then prescribed for all contexts, some of which have features that do not come close
to approximating the features assumed in the philosopher's imagination. For example, the controlled
conditions of philosophical imagination have tended to assume conditions in which interlocutors
exchanging reasons have equal social power, and so philosophers have developed models of moral
justification based on this assumption. These models may work well in situations where people are
social equals, just as the AZT drug regimen worked well in populations who had adequate infrastructure
and their basic health needs met. Yet a model of moral justification designed for conditions of social
equality may be ineffective in situations where people have unequal social power, and may even be
harmful if the model obscures power dynamics operative in that context or makes it too easy to
rationalize power abuse. If the conditions of the real world diverge too much from the conditions of the
philosopher's imagination, then prescribing a particular model of justification for real‐world conditions
may be like prescribing the AZT drug regimen in sub‐Saharan contexts—both ineffective and potentially
harmful.
The analogy between clinical research and research in moral epistemology is admittedly imperfect, but
it is good enough to extract the point we wish to make: in order to develop appropriate medical

interventions for specific types of contexts, clinical researchers have to examine carefully the
relationship between drug protocols and the context in which they are to be used. Researchers cannot
know whether a particular drug will be effective or harmful in a particular context without careful
attention to the interaction between the two, because certain features of the context, including social,
environmental, and cultural factors, partially determine which drug protocol is likely to be effective.
Similarly, we suggest that justifying moral claims involves a relationship between a reasoning practice
and the context in which it is used. Philosophers cannot know which practices are fitting to use in which
types of situation without carefully studying the relationship between reasoning practices and their
contexts of use, since certain features of a context partially determine which reasoning practices are
capable of justifying moral claims in that context.
These considerations suggest two points about moral epistemology. First, and as we argue in the
companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” we think that moral epistemology should
adopt a more modest mission. Rather than searching for the single, multipurpose model of reasoning
capable of justifying moral claims in all contexts, our mission instead should be to seek guidelines
enabling reasoners to select reasoning practices likely to be effective in particular types of situations.
Second, we think the study of moral justification needs to be much more empirically grounded. In order
to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of
contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts
in which they work well.
Like a number of other contemporary philosophers, we advocate a methodological turn in moral and
political philosophy, including moral epistemology, toward more empirically informed philosophical
research. This turn is often called a move toward naturalizing epistemology and methodology because
philosophers are attempting to make their research more continuous with results from empirical
science. Some philosophers are using empirical findings from other disciplines, whereas other
philosophers are attempting to conduct their own empirical research. Our proposal shares in the
naturalizing spirit of these developments, but it suggests a new and distinct method for doing
empirically grounded—naturalized—moral epistemology.
Specifically, we propose that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which
people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. Case studies always focus
on what is being studied in relation to its environment, which makes this a promising method for
investigating relationships between reasoning practices and their contexts of use. When investigating a
case study, philosophers identify and explain the reasoning people are actually using in their particular
attempts to justify a moral claim, and evaluate whether or not those reasoning practices are likely to
facilitate or undermine moral justification in that case. We argue that working through case studies
enables philosophers to understand better the obstacles to achieving moral justification that diversity
and social power inequality actually pose, as opposed to the obstacles philosophers imagine they pose.
Focusing on case studies may also enable philosophers to identify reasoning practices that actually work
to mitigate the disruptive impact of these obstacles in certain cases, rather than the practices
philosophers imagine to work.
This article motivates and explains our proposed case study method in moral epistemology and goes on
to defend and illustrate the philosophical value of this method. Section 2 motivates our proposal for
using case studies in moral epistemology, making reference to our critical work in the first of these

companion articles. In section 3, we explain what a case study is and our proposal for how to use this
method in moral epistemology. The remainder of the article defends and illustrates our proposal by
sharing one of our case studies, demonstrating how we analyze and assess it.

2. Why Do We Need a New Method for Doing Moral Epistemology?
In “Situating Moral Justification” we challenged the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to
establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification, and we illustrated this claim
through a critical assessment of discourse ethics. We argued that using the reasoning recommended by
discourse ethics is not rational in all circumstances. Specifically, we argued that it is unlikely to be
rational in situations marked by cultural diversity and social inequality because the reasoning strategy is
too susceptible to misuse by those with more social power. We used the example of discourse ethics to
support our larger point, which is that no reasoning practice can be assumed to deliver authoritative
moral conclusions independently of the social context in which it is used.
In our view, most philosophers have underestimated the challenges that diversity and inequality can
pose to achieving moral justification in real‐world settings. To be minimally acceptable, a reasoning
practice must be plausible to and usable by moral agents in the case at hand, nonabusive of social
power or vulnerability, and capable of delivering feasible conclusions. We take these conditions partially
to define a perspective from which to validate moral claims in the types of contexts with which we are
concerned. They provide some initial, broadly normative constraints on reasoning strategies that may
count as minimally acceptable, and they guide our evaluation of reasoning practices in the real‐world
cases of moral argumentation that we study. We contend, however, that what it means to satisfy these
conditions will depend on the situation in which the occasion for moral justification arises. The
situational features that influence whether and how a reasoning practice will satisfy these adequacy
conditions include the social relations of power and vulnerability among moral interlocutors in particular
situations of dispute, as well as the particular moral vocabularies and styles of reasoning that are
available, meaningful, and usable to and by various parties.
Taking seriously the view that moral justification always requires situated, social reasoning practices
suggests the need for a new mission for the part of moral epistemology that studies moral justification.
The mission can no longer be to establish a single reasoning practice or set of practices for use in any
and all situations. This mission might be suitable for a world in which diversity and inequality were not
ubiquitous, but this is not our world. In our world, to prescribe for all contexts a single practice of
justification that has been developed under the controlled conditions of the philosopher's imagination
may at best be ineffective and at worst harmful (potentially reinforcing or rationalizing power abuse) in
situations that do not match these conditions.
Rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers
cannot understand which reasoning practices are suitable to use in which contexts exclusively by
imagining or exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which
reasoning practices and argumentative strategies are capable of justifying moral claims in different types
of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the
contexts in which they are used.
We propose that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack
shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. A case study model of naturalizing is

particularly well suited for the conception of moral justification we defend as a situated social practice.
Through investigating case studies, philosophers can scrutinize the details of particular situations in
order to discern which social variables are salient in given cases, and examine how those variables
operate either to support or undermine reasoning that is plausible, usable, power sensitive, and capable
of delivering feasible conclusions.

3. A Case Study Method for Doing Moral Epistemology
A case study is a detailed investigation of an instance of something in a specific context. Case studies
always focus on understanding what is being studied in relation to its environment or context (Flyvbjerg
2011, 301). Also inherent in the idea of a case study is the idea that it represents some wider class of
cases, so cases are investigated not simply in their unique particularity but with the thought that
studying them will shed light on other cases.
In our case studies, we begin by identifying a particular instance of a practice of moral justification that
people are using in an attempt to justify a substantive moral claim about an issue that is under dispute.
We try to specify the practice of moral justification that the instance exemplifies by identifying central
assumptions people are relying on and their implicit norms of reasoning. We analyze each instance of
justification by modeling how it delineates moral domain, characterizes moral agency, specifies
reasoning strategies, and prescribes courses of action. The result is a descriptive model of a real‐world
practice of justification that can be evaluated by our adequacy conditions and compared with the
practices other people are using or that philosophers have modeled. Using our adequacy conditions, we
assess each practice in order to discern which, if any, is likely to yield morally justified claims in each
case. We try to explain why certain practices are exemplary in each case and why others work less well
to justify moral claims in each situation. From these explanations, across a range of cases, we develop
prescriptive guidelines for when certain practices should be used in certain contexts, and how they
should be used in those contexts. The guidelines are ways of linking exemplary practices with their
context of use. In order to investigate case studies, philosophers need to know how to select cases, how
to specify which features of cases to study, how to evaluate cases, and what to do with the results of
these assessments. In what follows we describe in more detail the case study method we recommend as
we use it, illustrating its general components.

3.1. How to Select Cases
First, our selection of cases is guided by our understanding of what moral justification is as well as gaps
we have perceived in philosophical study of moral justification up to this point. Our selection of cases is
broad because we select cases that include reasoning practices that have been either ignored or
denigrated by previous philosophers, but it is narrowed by our philosophical account of moral
justification as a norm‐governed practice of exchanging reasons. As regards breadth, our inclusiveness is
not random or whimsical but linked with the explicit theoretical goals we are trying to achieve. We tend
toward inclusiveness so as to minimize prejudging what may count as moral reasoning. In the case of
morality, we regard everyone (almost) as a full‐fledged moral agent. If the moral thinking of ordinary
people were to be ruled out, this would result in a kind of moral elitism and authoritarianism on the part
of philosophers. So we select cases that examine the moral reasoning of people whom contemporary
philosophers have tended to exclude, people whose reasoning strategies may be unfamiliar to
philosophers or have been denigrated as logical fallacies or as folklore or superstition. Our rationale for
tending toward inclusiveness is linked with our adequacy conditions, which express the conviction that

to be minimally acceptable as candidates for facilitating moral justification, a reasoning practice must be
capable of addressing the concerns of those who are most vulnerable in a particular situation and must
not too easily rationalize the moral perspectives of those with the most power in that situation. As
regards narrowness, this inclusiveness is reined in by our conception of moral justification as involving
exchange of reasons, which rules out such practices as reading the runes or reporting visits from the
archangels.
Philosophers can further narrow their selection of cases on the basis of what specific question or set of
questions they are trying to answer. In our case, we want to understand which practices of moral
justification are likely to work best for rationally resolving moral disputes where people are culturally
diverse and/or socially unequal. Diversity and inequality are endemic to the world as we know it, and to
most situations of intransigent moral disagreement. For this reason we think they should be at the
center of philosophical accounts of moral justification, but moral philosophers up to this point have
placed them at the periphery, as a problem of application. We place them at the center by selecting
cases of moral disagreement in which people have diverse cultural perspectives and/or stand to one
another in relations of social power and vulnerability.
Philosophers must further narrow the range of cases they will study under their broad research
objectives, for there are likely to be indefinitely many cases that might fit with these broad goals. For
example, there are many kinds of diversity and inequality manifest in different contexts and at different
periods in history. So just selecting cases of moral dispute marked by diversity and inequality is still too
broad. Our goal is not to establish the new, best, single reasoning practice that will be usable to justify
moral claims in all situations, or even in all situations of diversity and inequality, but we do want to
develop results that are useful for addressing more than one instance of inequality and more than one
dimension of diversity. So we select cases that highlight varying types of diversity and inequality,
manifest in different arrangements that are still fairly contemporary.
In our own work, we focus specifically on cultural and religious diversity and on power/vulnerability
relations linked with gender and global location. Our rationale for focusing on these features of cases is
linked with our adequacy conditions and especially our concern to be more inclusive than philosophers
have been, but we fully recognize that there are other dimensions of diversity (e.g., political diversity,
ethnicity, spiritual [nonreligious] traditions) as well as many other types of social power/vulnerability
relations (e.g., class, disability, sexuality, race) that the case studies we investigate do not foreground
but that certainly need to be studied. In this article we share a case study of a moral dispute across two
communities that are divided by fairly significant cultural differences but linked through a history of
colonization.
Our work focuses on disputes from the twentieth and twenty‐first centuries. It is highly likely that the
epistemic character of moral reasoning has changed with historical shifts that have radically altered the
local and global order. We select cases that highlight what we think are particularly salient relations of
diversity and inequality in recent history that have been forged through experiences of colonization,
democratization, and contemporary globalization so that our guidelines are applicable to occasions of
moral justification in the contemporary world. Historical details reaching farther back in time may turn
out to be relevant to the analysis of cases, but we fix selection of cases by the time frame of the dispute
and we focus on contemporary disputes. For example, the case study we share in this article examines a

contemporary disagreement over how to morally evaluate practices of female genital cutting among the
Maasai.
The central point is that we select cases representing different arrangements of inequality and diversity
within a limited, recent historical window so that our results are plausibly applicable for contemporary
moral conflicts of this kind and have traction in more than one type of case. We select cases where
there are attempts at moral justification, but we broaden our understanding of morality to include more
than previous philosophers have included. We narrow our focus further by selecting cases of moral
dispute over socially pertinent issues where parties to the dispute are diverse and/or socially unequal.
We narrow it further still by specifying which types of diversity and inequality, manifest in which types
of arrangements, in which historical time period.
Finally, there is often an element of chance or serendipity in how cases are selected. In our work we
select cases from moral disputes we happened to be somewhat familiar with already, either because
they were taking place in communities to which we belong or because they were topics in the media
and in scholarly debates at the time that were relevant to our current research and teaching
opportunities. For example, female genital cutting received extensive attention from the media and
from human rights organizations in the last two decades of the twentieth century.

3.2. Describing, Analyzing, and Evaluating Practices of Moral Justification in Each
Case
Once cases are selected, analyzing and evaluating the practices of moral justification that they exemplify
can be divided into five tasks. These are not presented, nor meant to be undertaken, in linear order but
are interrelated components of the descriptive, evaluative, and explanatory tasks involved in
investigating a case study of moral justification for normative moral epistemology. The five tasks are:
(1) Identify an instance of a moral dispute where there is an attempt at moral justification. On each
“side” of the dispute, people are entering a moral claim and giving reasons in support of the claim.
(2) Specify the practice of moral justification that each instance exemplifies. Each instance we observe is
an instance of a social practice of moral justification, which is a norm‐governed exchange of reasons
aimed at moral knowledge. We try to specify the practice as it is being performed in the instance we
have observed by identifying the norms governing that process and the assumptions on which it rests.
(3) Analyze each practice by describing how it delineates the moral domain, characterizes agency,
specifies reasoning methods and combines them into a strategy, and prescribes action. The result is a
descriptive model of a specific practice of moral justification that can be evaluated using our adequacy
conditions. Our categories for analyzing real‐world practices of moral justification in each case are the
same categories we use to analyze practices of justification developed by philosophers. We use these
same categories in order to be able to compare real‐world practices of justification with those practices
defended by philosophers and to evaluate them on the basis of the same adequacy conditions. That is,
these categories provide a way of organizing different practices of moral justification into a common
rubric for comparison and evaluation.
(4) Evaluate each practice as analyzed. Our adequacy conditions are designed to assess the fit between a
practice of moral justification and the context in which it is used, to see which practices are exemplary,
which are less capable of yielding moral knowledge in which situations, and why.

(5) Explain why certain practices appear to be a better fit than others. What is it about the context that
makes a certain practice of moral justification a good fit, or not, for that context?

3.3. Generalizations Across Cases
In studying each case, we want to understand the relationships between better and worse practices of
moral justification that people are using and the situations in which they are using them. Our broader
research goal, however, requires providing more than an array of interesting case studies illustrating a
range of successful or unsuccessful moral reasoning practices. Recall that the mission we propose for
moral epistemology is to develop guidelines for selecting practices of justification appropriate for
contexts characterized by cultural and religious diversity and/or pervasive social inequality. Through our
best efforts at understanding the relationship between better and worse reasoning practices and the
features of the contexts in which they are more successful or less successful, we hope to discover
regularities that can be the basis for developing these general normative guidelines.1
In order to achieve this mission, beginning from a series of case studies, philosophers identify any
regularities across cases in order to understand what, if anything, exemplary practices have in common.
That is, although the exemplary practices of justification differ across cases (there is a plurality of good
practices), we investigate what, if any, features these practices share that make them good fits for
situations marked by the kinds of diversity and inequality we study. For example, our larger project
highlights three exemplary practices that have been used in three real‐world situations marked by three
different arrangements of diversity and inequality. We attempt to discern what all three practices have
in common that makes them well suited for these types of contexts. These common features are
suggestive for helping us understand how to select reasoning practices for these types of situations and
how to use them well, and so provide a basis for formulating guidelines.
In the remainder of the article we present one of our case studies in order to illustrate the method of
naturalizing that we recommend for moral epistemology. This case study examines a dispute over the
moral status of female genital cutting (FGC) as practiced among the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania. In
the next section, we situate the dispute, introduce the disputants, and specify the practice of moral
justification each “side” is using in this case. In section 5, we analyze each practice through the
categories of domain, agency, reasoning strategies, and outcome, and using our adequacy conditions we
evaluate the use of each practice in this situation. We explain why we think that one practice is more
successful, that is, more morally rational, than the other in this case although both practices have some
weaknesses. We conclude by explaining how, from a series of case studies like this one, philosophers
may develop guidelines for selecting justificatory practices appropriate for particular types of social
contexts.

4. A Case Study: Moral Reasoning About FGC Among the Maasai
4.1. Situating the Moral Dispute and Introducing the Disputants
The Maasai live primarily in the Rift Valley region spanning present‐day Kenya and Tanzania.2 Maasai
“circumcise” both male and female children around puberty and practice what the World Health
Organization calls types I and II circumcision of females in a ceremony that is conducted exclusively by
elder women. Both male and female rituals mark gendered social transitions. 3 For females, FGC signifies
a transition from being a girl child to becoming a Maasai woman, which is a new social role with new
responsibilities.4 Becoming a Maasai woman makes one marriageable within the community, and being

married is a socially necessary condition for being able to build and “own” one's own house within a
homestead. Today practices of FGC are illegal in both Kenya and Tanzania where Maasai live, but Maasai
are reportedly very resistant to eradication efforts.
Over the past three decades, eradicating FGC has been a high priority on the moral agenda of many
women's human rights and development organizations. These organizations argue that FGC is morally
wrong and that the international community has a moral responsibility to support, or even spearhead,
eradication efforts. We call this influential line of thinking the Women's Human Rights Approach (WHR).
WHR has come under criticism from some scholars and activists who study and work in communities
where FGC is practiced.5 Their shared line of critique is that WHR generates misleading, and even
morally mistaken, conclusions about why these practices are wrong, who is responsible for the harm,
and how to address the harm. These critics offer an alternative moral evaluation of FGC that relies on a
different justificatory practice.
This case study examines the two practices of moral justification used in these two contrasting
evaluations of FGC.6 Both “sides” of this dispute use human rights as moral standards to evaluate FGC
among the Maasai. However, each uses a distinct practice of moral justification in which human rights
function very differently, generating dissimilar results. The disagreement between the two “sides” of
this dispute does not refer to public debate in a single forum with two self‐consciously identified
opposing viewpoints. Instead, we identify two lines of moral argumentation that have emerged in the
global controversy over the moral status of practices of FGC, and we develop a case study that looks at
one instantiation of this debate as it has played out in disputes over FGC among the Maasai.7 In the
remainder of this section, we specify the practice of justification each “side” is using. In section 5, we
analyze and evaluate each practice as it is used in this case.

4.2. Evaluating Maasai FGC by Appealing to Women's Human Rights
For the past four decades there has been a global movement to reconceptualize human rights so as to
include the often neglected gender‐specific rights of women.8 Early rights documents, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948), protected individuals against abuse in the
public realm of employment and citizenship and from state interference in private affairs, yet they
ignored many of the most egregious moral violations against women, which occurred within the so‐
called private realm of family, religion, and culture. On the early human rights paradigm, many
systematic violations against women were defined outside the scope of rights and construed as matters
of cultural or religious practice.9
The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995,10 addressed this issue directly by
bringing culture and religion under critical moral scrutiny. This conference produced a document called
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which expands the list of universal rights by offering a
gender‐specific interpretation of human rights and identifying many social practices that violate these
rights, including FGC, which it tendentiously calls FG “Mutilation.”11 Here is what The Beijing Platform
says about what it calls FGM: FGM is an act of violence against women that violates their human rights
(United Nations 1995, article 113). Violence against women is “any form of gender‐based violence that
results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, or psychological harm” (article 113). Violence against
women is “a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which
have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of
women's full advancement” (article 118). These historically unequal power relations between men and

women derive “essentially from cultural patterns, in particular the harmful effects of certain traditional
or customary practices” (article 118). The Beijing Platform recommends that governments “prohibit
female genital mutilation wherever it exists and give vigorous support to efforts among non‐
governmental and community organizations and religious institutions to eliminate such practices”
(article 232).
The World Health Organization and other U.N. organizations use the gender‐specific interpretation of
human rights (WHR) articulated in The Beijing Platform to argue that FGC violates the rights of the child
and of women “to health, security and physical integrity, and to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment.”12 The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has issued at
least one report that focuses specifically on Maasai communities (United Nations 2012). This report
concludes that Maasai practices of FGC constitute a practice of systematic violence against women that
is the result of historical relations of male domination and female subordination that are deeply rooted
in Maasai culture. This line of argument is bolstered with accounts of Maasai men and women defending
FGC on grounds of respect for culture, which are then used to reinforce the belief that these gender‐
specific wrongs have cultural roots (United Nations 2012).13 The report concludes with the following:
It is the adherence to their own traditions that makes eradication of FGM among the Maasai
such an uphill task for those seeking to end the practice. … Nevertheless, the outside world is
slowly influencing the Maasai way of life with more girls and boys being enrolled in formal
education and learning about the risks associated with FGM. … The eradication of FGM brings
with it the consequence of forever altering the traditions of what is one of the few remaining
authentic African societies. … The challenge anti‐FGM campaigners face is how to change this
one harmful aspect of Maasai tradition without tainting the authenticity, or undermining the
richness, of their culture. (United Nations 2012)
On WHR, the wrong is so‐called FGM, characterized as an act of violence against women; the social
structures enabling this violence are Maasai gender relations premised on male domination and female
subordination, which are a product of Maasai culture; and the agents enacting the violence are Maasai
men and complicit elder Maasai women. On this way of framing the issue, it follows that attempts to
eliminate this moral wrong must change the culture in which it is embedded.
In order to justify their conclusions, those using WHR advocate a practice of moral justification that
appeals to a universal moral standard. We call this practice deductive application of a universal moral
standard (DAU). As used in this case by WHR advocates, DAU has at least five central features:
1. DAU appeals to a single moral standard—women's human rights—that is intended to apply to a
single phenomenon—FGC—whenever and wherever it occurs, yielding conclusions that are
taken to be universal in scope.
2. The moral standard to which DAU appeals is fairly settled. A standard or principle can be more
or less abstract. For example, the principle “do no harm” is quite abstract, leaving a lot of
interpretive room for deciding what counts as harm. By contrast, women's human rights as
articulated in The Beijing Platform are intentionally concrete; they are designed to bring into
focus gender‐specific wrongs in order to plug the loopholes in earlier conceptualization of
human rights. The specificity of a women's human rights standard means that it already contains
the core moral analysis.14 That is, it defines which social practices are morally wrong and

provides an account of why they are wrong. This means that anyone using the standard starts
his or her moral evaluation with a prefabricated moral frame that foregrounds gender and
culture. When the standard is applied in particular cases, other features of the social contexts
where practices of FGC occur recede into the background and are obscured from the outset.
3. Relatedly, women's human rights standards have the status of basic principles. Although human
rights are not impervious in principle to critique and revision (and although The Beijing Platform
document itself demonstrates how they may be revised), they are taken to express fairly
widespread, global overlapping consensus on our most reliable moral principles at this point in
history. On DAU, “appealing” to women's human rights here means deductively applying a
universal standard to concrete cases in order to demonstrate to doubters that particular
instantiations of FGC violate women's human rights.
4. It is assumed that further information about the contexts where FGC occurs, including historical
information about the emergence and meanings of these practices, has no moral salience. For
example, FGC as practiced among the Maasai in Kenya is very different from FGC as practiced
among Muslims in Indonesia, but when using DAU a person enters both contexts already
knowing that these practices are wrong, and knowing why they are wrong (that is, all instances
of FGC reflect and reinforce culturally specific gender relations premised on male domination
and female subordination). Contextual and historical details are used to recruit evidence
showing how a particular practice is indeed an instance of FGC. On DAU, the person applying the
moral standard focuses on the situation to ensure it exemplifies the standard, but not to revise
the standard or determine its meaning. DAU recognizes that contextual and historical details
may put one in a better position to communicate to resisters the already established true moral
conclusions or may be used to make eradication efforts as culturally palpable as possible, but
these details do not influence the moral analysis.
5. WHR advocates also use the auxiliary reasoning strategy of imaginative projection to bolster
their primary argument by inviting “us” to imagine ourselves in “their” situation of horror.15 One
aim of imaginative projection is to encourage an empathetic response to the situation of
victims. As used in this case, inputs to the imaginative exercise include photographs and videos
that portray screaming young girls crying uncontrollably. These images are plucked from their
context, leaving the imaginer a great deal of latitude to fill in the details.

4.3. Evaluating Maasai FGC Through the Frame of Colonial History
Although a WHR approach to FGC is widely accepted, some scholars and activists criticize this
argumentative strategy. The critics to whom we refer do not dispute that many practices of FGC are in
some sense harmful, nor do they reject women's human rights as important moral tools (Nnaemeka
2005; Nnaemeka and Ezeilo 2005; Abusharaf 2006). Rather, they object to the strategies of moral
reasoning used by WHR advocates in their use of human rights, and the way WHR advocates frame the
issue and characterize moral agency in evaluating FGC. Taken collectively, the work of these critics offers
a sustained argument that WHR systematically conceals features of the social and historical contexts in
which FGC occurs that are highly relevant for an adequate moral evaluation of these practices. In this
section, we present one version of this criticism and an alternative moral analysis of FGC among the
Maasai through the frame of colonial history. We call this a postcolonial analysis approach (PCA).
As mentioned in the introduction to this case, Maasai FGC initiates the social transition of a girl into
womanhood. In the period prior to formal colonization in 1921,16 social responsibilities associated with

Maasai womanhood included a significant amount of economic and political authority. Though a
married elder male enjoyed political authority over general homestead management, each wife within a
homestead built and controlled access to her house (Talle 1998, 133). Anthropologist Aud Talle
describes house occupancy as the base of female social agency within Maasai communities (1998, 133).
For example, Maasai wives had authority to initiate and testify at judicial proceedings, and they
participated in dispute resolution both within and between homesteads (Hodgson 1999, 48). Maasai
wives controlled the production and distribution of milk, which is a primary food staple for the Maasai;
they had to be consulted in decisions about whether to slaughter, trade, or give away an animal; and
they were the primary economic agents in a barter economy, traveling to markets outside the
homestead in order to barter surplus milk and hides in exchange for other important goods (48).
Talle's research shows that the cultural logic of Maasai life has long linked FGC with economic and
political roles for women because only married women could assume these roles and only “circumcised”
women could marry. Anthropologist Dorothy Hodgson notes, however, that in precolonial times Maasai
gender relations were neither dualistic nor hierarchical but based on notions of complementarity and
interdependence. While it was always possible to distinguish between a domestic sphere of home and
homestead and a public space outside the homestead, both males and females occupied important
social roles in both domestic and public space (Hodgson 1999, 58; Hodgson 2001). Hodgson argues that
the term “patriarchy” does not accurately describe the nature of Maasai gender relations prior to
colonization because, despite the rigidly defined gender roles for both males and females, social
relations between the sexes were not premised on principles of male domination and female
subordination.
Maasai gender relations shifted dramatically, however, during and after formal colonization by the
British (c. 1920–1961). As Hodgson describes it, British authorities mapped a culturally specific gender
ideology onto their perceptions of and interventions into Maasai life, creating “the male domains of
public and political in opposition and superior to the female domains of private and domestic” (1999,
57).
There were at least three colonial policies that significantly altered Maasai gender relations. First, the
policy of indirect rule required identifying a central Maasai authority to act as an intermediary between
the Maasai and the British. In implementing this policy, British authorities assumed that male elders
were already “the” political leaders, thereby extending the authority of select male elders over both
junior men and women, strengthening and consolidating their power. By creating a centralized male
political authority, indirect rule undermined whatever political power Maasai women may have
previously enjoyed (Hodgson 1999, 53–55). Second, needing to create a cash economy in order to
produce tax revenue for the Crown, the British also transformed a previously female‐based barter
economy into a newly male‐dominated cash economy. Livestock was now to be bought and sold on the
market for cash, and colonial authorities assumed that males were the “owners” of cattle. So Maasai
men were integrated into the new economy as buyers and sellers of livestock, while Maasai women
were dispossessed of their previously shared cattle rights and now struggled to gain access to cash
“indirectly through gifts from men or the sale of cattle by their sons or husbands” (57). The third policy,
which followed directly from the second, was to implement a new system of taxation. This system
designated male elders as “tax payers” and “heads of household,” who were now required to pay a
“plural wives” tax for “dependent” women living on their homestead (58).

On the surface, these policies appeared gender‐neutral, but they reflected a British gender ideology that
was deeply patriarchal. The combined effect of these colonial policies was severe political and economic
disempowerment and symbolic devaluation of Maasai women. Foregrounding colonial history reveals
that contemporary Maasai gender relations, which today are identified as “authentically” and deeply
embedded in Maasai culture, are really a “co‐invention” by British colonial authorities and opportunistic
Maasai in a fairly recent struggle for power.17
The postcolonial analysis (PCA) of Maasai FGC suggests an alternative moral analysis. Contrary to the
WHR conclusion, PCA does not portray Maasai FGC as a violent manifestation of the historically unequal
power relations between Maasai men and women rooted in inherently patriarchal Maasai cultural
patterns. This analysis keeps the idea that the wrong committed is practices of violence against women,
and also the idea that the social structures enabling this form of violence include gender relations
premised on male domination and female subordination. However, on PCA, the gender relations
enabling and maintaining this form of violence result in part from the historical experience of European
colonization of Kenya and Tanzania, and so the agents enacting this violence are a complex cast of
characters, including British colonizers who imposed a distinctively British patriarchal gender ideology
on Maasai through a variety of colonial interventions.
WHR contends that the harmful gender relations supporting Maasai FGC derive from cultural patterns
that belong essentially to the Maasai, but PCA argues that this claim is false. Some physical harms or
risks associated with Maasai FGC have likely always been present, but PCA suggests that the practice
does not become a manifestation of patriarchal violence against women until the colonial encounter, or
rather that it becomes a tool of male dominance only in the context of this encounter. The harmful
gender relations that today give symbolic meaning to Maasai FGC derive from cultural patterns, but the
cultural patterns from which they derive resulted from a forced blending of British gender ideology with
preexisting Maasai social categories.
An alternative practice of moral justification supports PCA, although advocates of this approach do not
explicitly defend this practice. PCA relies on a practice of moral justification that we call empirically
informed reflective equilibrium (EIRE). EIRE, as used in this case, recommends using women's human
rights as a universal moral standard that flags morally suspicious gendered practices but interprets the
moral standard in light of a particular social and historical context in order to discern whether there is a
moral violation in this case, and if so, to generate a comprehensive account of that violation. As used in
this case, EIRE has at least five features that distinguish it from DAU used by WHR advocates.
1. On EIRE, moral evaluation of FGC does not start with a single universal moral standard of human
rights that already tells us FGC, as a singular phenomenon, is wrong. Instead, EIRE begins with
contextual scrutiny of FGC in a particular situation and assumes that there is no culturally
neutral description of FGC. Even if physical descriptions of these practices may be similar, their
symbolic and cultural meanings vary widely. The “it” being described is not assimilated to
practices all over the world. Instead, different cases and their meanings have to be studied in
context, which means that EIRE will yield conclusions that are narrow rather than universal in
scope. For example, in this case conclusions could only be reached about Maasai FGC. As a
practice of reflective equilibrium, EIRE also begins with multiple inputs, including women's
human rights, colonial history, and Maasai cultural understandings about FGC.

2. EIRE accepts the status of women's human rights as important moral principles, which in this
case are designed to pick out social practices that manifest violence against women. EIRE
notices, however, that despite the attempts to formulate women's human rights in ways that
allow little room for interpretation, there are always borderline cases where genital
interventions may or may not be argued to be violent (e.g., some symbolic genital nicking). EIRE
also notices that cultures are not self‐contained, readily identifiable entities, and that there is
also not a culturally neutral interpretation of women's human rights.
3. EIRE takes human rights as moral standards that need interpreting in light of particular cases
rather than just implemented in a deductive manner. Recall that on the WHR model, which uses
DAU, contextual details of particular cases do not influence the moral analysis, because the
moral analysis is already given in the standard. By contrast, on PCA, which uses EIRE, contextual
details have salience in shaping our moral assessment of the situation and our interpretation of
women's human rights and not just in persuading doubters or tailoring eradication efforts. In
this case, through reasoning by EIRE, advocates of PCA use historical details to reveal a more
comprehensive account of the human rights abuses Maasai women have suffered, which
include the abuses they experienced in the colonial period.18
4. Relatedly, EIRE uses women's human rights as one important source of moral knowledge but
appeals to other sources of knowledge—including, in this case, history, gender studies,
postcolonial studies, and anthropology—in order to interpret human rights in light of social and
cultural contexts, thereby making the reflective equilibrium wide rather than narrow.
5. Finally, imagination is also used in reasoning by EIRE. The imaginative inputs available through
EIRE include a rich historical and cultural picture of a particular practice as performed by a
specific group of people, which leaves the imaginer with less latitude to fill in details.

5. Assessing the Alternative Practices of Moral Justification Used in This
Case
The practice of moral justification used by WHR is deductive application of a universal moral standard
(DAU), and the practice used by PCA is empirically informed reflective equilibrium (EIRE). Both practices
use women's human rights as moral standards to evaluate practices of FGC among the Maasai, but the
two practices use human rights quite differently. In this section we analyze each practice as used in this
case through the categories of moral domain, moral agency, reasoning strategies, and outcome, and we
evaluate each practice using the adequacy conditions we have previously defended.

5.1. Delineating the Moral Domain
Any practice of moral justification will include some way of framing moral issues that determines which
issues fall within the scope of morality and how issues that fall within the frame are characterized. Those
using DAU frame FGC as a contemporary violation of a universal human right. DAU diagnoses the
violation using a single undifferentiated category of “FG Mutilation,” which is defined as a specifically
gendered practice in a named but otherwise nonspecific local culture, operating in an unexamined
global context. By contrast, advocates of EIRE focus on the specific practice of FGC within the particular
ethnic group of the Maasai and analyze this practice in the historical context of European colonization of
Kenya and Tanzania in order to discern whether there is a rights violation in this case, and if so, to
interpret the violation(s) in light of these details.

Each way of framing the issue is simultaneously wider and narrower than the other. The DAU frame is
broader because, in evaluating this case, it relies on a broad understanding of FGC which it calls FGM,
and treats all practices everywhere as morally equivalent. Yet it is also narrower than the EIRE frame
because it is preset to foreground gender and culture to the exclusion of geography and history. By
contrast, the EIRE frame is narrower than the DAU frame insofar as it resists using a comprehensive
category of FGC and instead focuses exclusively on the practice as it occurs among Maasai. Yet, it is also
broader and more flexible than the DAU frame insofar as it does not preset the categories of moral
evaluation. Instead, it allows salient categories of moral assessment to emerge through empirical
inquiry. In this example, those using EIRE place Maasai FGC in the context of more than a century of
colonial history. Each delineation of the moral domain highlights and obscures different aspects of the
practice of FGC among the Maasai and uses these to justify different moral conclusions.
In this case, we think that the frame employed by those relying on EIRE is a more morally rational way to
view the moral domain because this frame makes visible several features of the situation that are
morally relevant but are hidden by the DAU framing. Specifically, those employing EIRE are able to show
how the social meaning of FGC for the Maasai today has been partially shaped by their experience of
colonization, a feature the DAU frame obscures. The moral analysis supported by EIRE is also able to
show how disregard of colonial history by using the DAU frame conceals the abuse of global power.
Portraying FGC among the Maasai simply as an abusive violation of human rights perpetrated on
indigenous women and girls by indigenous men and complicit elder women not only oversimplifies the
practice, it also disproportionately brings under moral scrutiny the lives of those with the least global
power while simultaneously protecting from moral scrutiny the behavior of those with more global
power who have also played a role in this issue.19

Finally, by using a moral frame that foregrounds culture to the exclusion of history and presumes
cultures to be self‐contained easily identifiable entities, DAU has rationalized eradication efforts
premised exclusively on cultural intervention. The colonial experience was already a devastating
encounter of violently imposed cultural change. So the DAU frame too easily legitimates potentially
harmful and infeasible interventions by people who already have a history of power abuse in this region.
By contrast, those using EIRE have the methodological resources to show that this understanding of
culture is flawed. Moreover, EIRE encourages moral analysts to be flexible in their framing and to
consider a wide range of empirical information pertinent to the particular situation under scrutiny when
delineating the moral domain.

5.2. Characterizing Moral Agents
The way each practice defines the moral domain shapes the ways in which moral agents are
characterized, including those harmed and how they are represented, those who have moral
responsibility for the harm, and those who are authorized to evaluate the harm.
How are the victims identified and represented on each approach? By framing FGC exclusively in terms
of gender and culture, DAU users take for granted that those wronged are the women who undergo the
practice. The women's perspective is assumed through imaginative projection, and they are taken to be
exclusively victims rather than agents. DAU does not enable the voices of Maasai women to be heard, or
they are quoted from out‐of‐context interviews where they are cited as defending FGC on cultural

grounds. These quotes get recruited as evidence to show that Maasai women are prisoners of either
false consciousness or moral backwardness.
By contrast, the broader frame of colonial history enables those using EIRE to notice that all Maasai,
men and women, have been harmed by the imposition of British gender ideology onto Maasai social life
while simultaneously allowing them to explain why and how Maasai women have suffered gender‐
specific injury. Those using EIRE in this case do not say much beyond this about the women who
undergo FGC, nor do they include their voices, which is a significant limitation of the way this practice is
used in this case. EIRE does, however, leave open the possibility of perceiving that Maasai women might
“choose” the practice in some sense and that they are not necessarily always being dragged kicking and
screaming. Moreover, those using EIRE can incorporate historical facts that may suggest an
interpretation of contemporary Maasai resistance to eradication projects as expressing moral agency
rather than as necessarily revealing false consciousness or moral backwardness. For example, EIRE
enables its users to notice the moral relevance of a 1950s Kenyan movement, in which Maasai
participated, called “I Will Circumcise Myself,” whereby young girls performed genital cuttings on
themselves in order to defy the legal ban imposed by British colonial authorities (Thomas 1996). EIRE
enables its users to consider the possibility that Maasai resistance to contemporary eradication efforts
reflects suspicion about foreign‐led interventions premised on cultural change by people from global
powers who have a morally poor track record in this region. By contrast, DAU makes it very difficult to
consider this possibility and instead encourages viewing Maasai women as mere objects of moral
concern. So despite its limitations as used in this case, EIRE makes it possible for its users to take a more
nuanced perspective on moral agency than DAU does because EIRE encourages the seeking of empirical
evidence that is morally relevant to the victimhood or agency of Maasai women.
Who is assigned moral culpability on each strategy? DAU encourages its users to blame people who
currently promote this FGC practice, either directly or indirectly, whereas EIRE enables consideration of
the culpability of a much broader range of candidates, including British colonizers who are now dead.
Those using the DAU frame identify members of the Maasai community exclusively as defendants and
also as the only defendants in this case. People located in the global north are methodologically
excluded as having no direct involvement with the practice, a distance that suggests that their proper
roles in its moral evaluation are those of prosecutor and impartial moral judge. By contrast, EIRE allows
its users to position people located in the global north as possible parties to the harm and so as
defendants in this case, thereby suggesting that the Maasai are not the only defendants. And as just
described, EIRE also enables repositioning all Maasai, men and women, as legitimate plaintiffs in a more
complex case of human rights abuse, which includes the abuse of colonization, thereby suggesting that
Maasai are not exclusively defendants.
Who is likely to be assigned moral standing to evaluate the harm on each approach? With DAU, human
rights are taken as universal standards of moral evaluation that apply to everyone everywhere in the
world and in whose maintenance everyone has a stake simply by virtue of being human. As with all
human rights problems, the state is primarily responsible to address the harm, and indeed Kenya
recently outlawed all participation in FGC in any way (Boseley 2011). However, DAU does not preclude
assuming that everyone everywhere has at least a prima facie claim to participate equally in evaluating
human rights abuses, an assumption that opens the possibility of legitimating NGO interventions and
perhaps even state support for religious organizations seeking to intervene. Although EIRE does not
preclude assuming that people everywhere have a stake in eliminating rights violations, this justificatory

practice does not require assuming that everyone's stake in every case is the same. In this example, by
focusing more narrowly on Maasai FGC, this approach implicitly identifies central protagonists, including
Maasai men, Maasai women, British colonial authorities, contemporary governments attempting to
outlaw FGC, and development organizations promoting eradication efforts in Maasai communities. It
simultaneously places others as peripheral stakeholders in this case, including people living in other
communities where FGC is practiced, such as Muslims in Indonesia, as well as people in parts of the
world whose connection with Maasai and their recent history is remote or nonexistent.
We think that in the particular case of FGC among the Maasai, EIRE enables a more acute assessment of
moral agency, including moral standing and responsibility, than DAU allows. EIRE permits consideration
of the possibility that DAU may enable the abuse of social power insofar as positioning the north as the
external moral critic unfairly makes people in this global location judge and jury of their own case. EIRE
also makes it possible for users to consider that Maasai opposition to eradication efforts may not be
matters of moral backwardness, ignorance, or false consciousness but instead may reflect reasonable
skepticism about interventions promoting cultural change. Finally, EIRE allows for a more variegated and
fairer picture of who has legitimate standing to evaluate the harm.

5.3. Strategies of Moral Reasoning
In DAU argumentation, top‐down inferences run in one direction from general to particular. The
argument is bare of details; most contextual factors are taken not to be morally salient, and might even
be distracting.20 DAU bolsters argumentation through a form of imaginative projection.
By contrast, EIRE involves reasoning by reflective analysis of particular cases in light of universal
standards and reinterpretation of universal standards in light of particular cases. EIRE also permits
seeking out the perspective of those who have the most at stake in the issue under scrutiny and who are
the most epistemically disadvantaged. Those using the EIRE argumentative strategy seek reflective
equilibrium among various descriptions of “the” problem, various accounts of the salience and
interpretation of proposed moral standards, and a variety of contextual factors, including historical and
power dimensions. A “horizontal” web of inferences runs among these.
In this case, our success criteria favor the reasoning recommended by EIRE as more rational than the
reasoning recommended by DAU. EIRE's flexibility and relative openness to new interpretations makes it
less likely than DAU to enable legitimation of power abuse and more likely to generate reasoning that is
plausible, is usable, and yields feasible conclusions. Human rights are a powerful and important moral
tool, but in this case they cannot function as the only moral tool. Moreover, they cannot be used
rationally in this type of context without recognizing that the meaning of human rights standards must
be interpreted in each case, not just preformed or implemented; furthermore, the interpretations must
be plausible to those whose lives stand to be most disrupted, so that the conclusions have normative
force and are feasible for them. In some contexts, deductive application of a universal moral standard
might be morally rational and might yield credible moral conclusions. Using EIRE, however, we can see
that the use of the DAU reasoning in the case of the Maasai allows for a corrupt moral analysis of FGC,
and that the reasoning strategy of DAU is itself corrupt in this case.
Moreover, EIRE also uses the imagination to encourage empathetic response, but it avoids
sensationalizing and “othering” the “exotic” and “savage” social practices of “darkest Africa.” EIRE
provides a more accurate cultural and historical picture of FGC among the Maasai, leaving the imaginer

with less latitude to fill in the details and directing the imaginer to cultivate a more accurate empathetic
response, which includes a more informed understanding of the practice as it occurs in this community,
a more complete picture of who has been involved in establishing the salience of the practice today, and
self‐knowledge about why Maasai might receive proposed interventions from members of Western
nations with suspicion. By contrast, the imaginative inputs available on DAU are decontextualized
photographs and video clips. The imaginer fills in the details, which makes it too easy to rely on
stereotypical information about unfamiliar peoples in “exotic” faraway places, and thereby too easy to
generate an inaccurate empathetic response that enables power abuse.
For all of these reasons, we argue that EIRE is capable of delivering a more comprehensive account of
the moral harm, a fairer account of who is responsible for the harm, and a more morally defensible basis
for decisions about whether to intervene, and if so who should intervene, and how.

5.4. Courses of Action Prescribed
Those who reason according to WHR prescribe state intervention to prohibit practices of FGC and
recommend institutional support to NGOs and religious organizations on grounds of humanitarian
intervention. The courses of action they prescribe advocate cultural change, although they puzzlingly
require that somehow intervening agencies must change just a single aspect of Maasai culture without
damaging the supposed authenticity or richness of Maasai traditions. In this case, those using EIRE do
not prescribe a determinate course of action for Maasai, which is a limitation of the way the practice is
used in this case. However, EIRE's requirement of attention to the role of contextual details in moral
analyses means that this approach encourages users to prescribe responses on a case‐by‐case basis, and
in addition leaves open the possibility that in some cases a response may not be warranted. And when a
response is warranted, the reasoning strategy of EIRE is more likely to yield a course of action tailored
appropriately to the material and existential realities of the people who have the most at stake in the
issue. Using EIRE, they are more likely to attend to historical and present power relations between those
proposing a course of action and those to whom they make such a proposal. For example, those using
EIRE might prescribe something like symbolic genital nicking or circumcision‐with‐words ceremonies,
which have emerged in other communities with similar histories. These responses are designed to
mitigate the long‐term health consequences and social harms associated with these practices, while
preserving elements of their cultural and social significance. So although DAU delivers a determinate
conclusion in this case, our success criteria suggest that those using EIRE are more likely than those
using DAU to reach moral conclusions that are less susceptible to power abuse and more feasible for
those most directly affected.

5.5. Summing Up Our Assessment of These Practices of Moral Justification
We conclude this section by drawing explicitly on our four assessment conditions to summarize our
evaluation of DAU and EIRE as practices of moral justification in this case. Although there may be other
situations in which DAU works well, we conclude that DAU is a less fitting practice of moral justification
than EIRE is in this particular case.
Plausibility. DAU and EIRE both appeal to human rights, but in our view EIRE enables a more plausible
way of using human rights as tools of moral assessment than DAU does in this case. DAU assumes that
“the” answer to “the” problem exists already in the form of a universal principle of women's human
rights that is already formulated at the appropriate level of abstraction for application in all contexts; it
is not too thin and not too thick. By contrast, EIRE assumes that the relevant standard or principle and

the appropriate level of interpretation for it will emerge as the “wrong” comes into clearer focus.
Interpreting human rights in light of the details of a particular practice of FGC in a specific place is more
likely to be able to link the moral authority of the conclusion with the reasoning that generates that
conclusion. Users of EIRE in this case also provide a more plausible story about the variety of rights
violations involved in this case and a more plausible interpretation of those violations that is likely to
seem less arbitrary or baffling to those most directly impacted.
Usability. Usability requires that all those affected be able to participate in moral reasoning; this may
require, for example, that participants utilize particular rituals or forms of speech. In this case, Maasai
are not actually using either reasoning strategy, which is a significant weakness of both approaches.
However, in our view EIRE has greater potential than DAU to better satisfy the usability condition in
situations like this one. The DAU strategy makes no room for cultural standards or contextual details to
interpret the meaning of rights; they are used only to tailor eradication efforts. Moreover, Maasai
opposition to moral arguments supported by DAU reasoning suggests that the reasoning being offered is
not plausible to many Maasai. One reason for this may be that the DAU reasoning strategy is not usable
by them in the sense of broadly conforming to internal cultural standards. EIRE leaves open the
possibility for Maasai standards of justification to be used because the reasoning strategy of EIRE
encourages its users to continually seek out new information from the particular social context under
scrutiny, and so it can incorporate Maasai moral perspectives in order to interpret, revise, or broaden
human rights principles.
Abuse of power or vulnerability. In our view, DAU is more vulnerable to abuse of power and vulnerability
than EIRE is in this case. DAU as used in this case brings under moral scrutiny the least powerful while
shielding the most powerful from scrutiny. DAU also makes its own moral framework appear
incontrovertible while too easily lending itself to discrediting anyone who uses an alternative
framework. In our assessment, DAU is more susceptible to power abuse in this context for at least three
reasons. First, it relies on a static and oversimplified notion of culture in a context in which cultural
interventions are not innocent but track global power relations both historically and at present. Second,
it also tends to assign “culture” to those with the least global power while simultaneously making
dominant global perspectives appear cultureless, which they are not. Finally, DAU foregrounds gender21
but places gender relations in a historical vacuum, and so obscures the complex web of historical
interactions among nations and cultures that have produced the specific gender relations within Maasai
communities that are today the object of global moral criticism. The epistemic stance enabled by DAU is
eerily similar to the perspective of British colonizers who perceived gender and culture in the Maasai
practices that were exotic or foreign to them, but who failed to see their own policies as gendered and
instead regarded them as natural and invisible. Although EIRE is certainly not immune from being
abused, it enables corrigibility and discourages dogmatism. EIRE's insistence on seeking out empirical
information relevant to understanding the contemporary social meaning of Maasai FGC and the
conditions that enable its continuance, as well as EIRE's ability to incorporate Maasai perspectives, make
this reasoning strategy less susceptible to power abuse than DAU in this situation.
Feasibility. Maasai are reported as very resistant to eradication efforts justified using DAU, efforts that
include state prohibition of FGC coupled with NGO and religious organization interventions that
advocate cultural change. In our view, this resistance provides prima facie evidence that the moral
conclusions defended by DAU are not feasible to many Maasai. The conclusions may seem arbitrary,
baffling, or suspicious given previously devastating interventions premised on cultural change. The
interventions might also be materially or existentially impossible for many Maasai, given the real
limitations of their situation and the complicated links between Maasai FGC and social life. In our view,

EIRE is likely more capable of delivering more feasible recommendations than DAU because people
using EIRE are not committed to prejudging cases but instead are encouraged to seek out all morally
salient information, including alternative moral perspectives. This means that EIRE‐derived solutions are
likely to be premised on more nuanced assessments of the risks and benefits of eradication efforts in
particular situations and to find solutions that are more likely to be real possibilities for people in the
contexts they actually live in.

6. Conclusion
Although in this case EIRE is a more successful reasoning model than DAU, using EIRE does not
guarantee a correct moral analysis for all cases. The upshot of our case study is not to defend EIRE as the
new privileged supermodel for all contexts. Certain aspects of EIRE are likely good reasoning practices in
other contexts too, but in other contexts the most rational practice of moral justification might look very
different. We are not defending any single procedure as the best for all contexts, or even for all contexts
of diversity and inequality. Rather, through a series of case studies like this one, we are looking for
regularities across cases in reasoning strategies that are more and less successful. For example, one
regularity might be that in situations of moral controversy where people are culturally diverse and
socially unequal, deductive application of a universal moral standard is inadequate because it proves to
be too susceptible to misuse by those with more social power. In other types of situations where
interlocutors share greater cultural competence and similar histories, and where the power inequalities
are less disparate, deductive application of a universal standard might be morally rational.
To conclude we return once more to the analogy with clinical research. There are enough physiological
similarities among human beings to predict that similarly situated human beings will respond similarly to
a drug protocol. Yet vast differences in cultural, political, and environmental aspects of social life situate
people differently enough to determine the effectiveness of a drug protocol only partially, meaning that
researchers often cannot proclaim a drug effective for all contexts. They have to study the relationship
between a drug protocol and its context of use to see if in fact it will be effective in that context.
Similarly, we have argued that a variety of social and cultural factors partially determine the fittingness
of a moral reasoning practice for a particular context, meaning that the mission to discover a single
superstrategy that can justify moral claims in any and all contexts may be a mission impossible. Instead,
we propose that philosophers study the interaction between reasoning practices and their context of
use in order to judge which practices are likely capable of justifying moral claims in particular types of
contexts, and to understand why—what it is about the context that makes some reasoning practices
effective and others ineffective or even harmful. From a series of cases, philosophers may discover
regularities that can be the basis for developing normative guidelines for selecting reasoning practices
likely to be appropriate for different types of situations, which is our newly stated mission for moral
epistemology.

Footnotes
1 We do not take up this part of the case study method in this essay.
2 The Maasai are pastoralists, although maintaining this seminomadic lifestyle is increasingly difficult
because state and private “ownership” of land forces them to acknowledge nation‐state borders
between Kenya and Tanzania. Maasai communities are organized around homesteads and are

traditionally polygamous. Gender and age are primary categories of social organization within
Maasai communities.
3 Male circumcision is not as much challenged by outsiders as FGC, on grounds that male circumcision is
not comparable in its harmful physical and sexual consequences to practices of FGC. It is at least
arguable, however, that male circumcision does not draw moral outrage from members of
Western nations because “we” routinely practice it, at least in the United States (much less so in
the United Kingdom), and so it does not appear morally problematic.
4 One Maasai woman interviewed by anthropologist Barbara Hoffman remarks that a female person
who has not experienced FGC is still considered a girl, even if she has had ten children. See
Hoffman 2002.
5 These critics include scholars who have training in African history, gender studies, anthropology, and
postcolonial studies, and activists who have worked to address a variety of women's issues,
including FGC, in local communities. See Abusharaf 2006. See also Nnaemeka 2005. We have
discerned a shared line of critique and alternative justificatory strategies used to evaluate FGC
among these thinkers and activists.
6 This case study draws from a less developed version by Tobin published elsewhere. See Tobin 2009.
Although the basic details of the case are the same, here we use the case study to develop
several epistemological and methodological points not made in the earlier work.
7 Another prominent strategy of moral opposition to Maasai FGC emphasizes the health risks and
physical and sexual harms associated with these practices. The health‐based approach has led to
modifications in how FGC is administered to make it safer and more consensual, but this
argument strategy does not directly attack the symbolic meanings of FGC or the cultural and
social structures that support their continuation. Our case study focuses instead on two lines of
moral argumentation that emphasize violence against women as the objectionable feature of
Maasai FGC.
8 This movement has been articulated in the United Nations' series of international conferences on
women: World Conference of the International Women's Year (Mexico City, 1975), reports
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/mexico.html; World Conference of
the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (Copenhagan, 1980),
reports available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/copenhagen.html; World
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for
Women: Equality, Development and Peace (Nairobi, 1985), reports available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/nairobi.html; Fourth World Conference on
Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace (Beijing, 1995), reports available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/fwcwn.html. Perhaps the most prominent
outcome of these conferences was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), initiated by the First World Conference (1975) and
prepared by groups within the 1976 Commission and Third Committee of the General Assembly
from 1977 to 1979 for presentation at the Second World Conference (1980). See United Nations,
“Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),”
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (1979), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm. Since the Four World
Conferences, Review and Appraisal sessions have been held every five years (2000, 2005, 2010).
Critics identified that the problem was not just discriminatory application of human rights

standards but was rooted in a narrow and gender‐biased conceptualization of human rights,
which covertly assumed that the bearer of rights was gendered masculine.
9 Susan Okin discusses the example of slavery being considered a human rights violation but the
practice of bride selling being perceived as a protected cultural practice rather than an instance
of slavery. See Okin 2000, 29.
10 See our footnote 8.
11 The Beijing Platform works within a human rights framework that builds on CEDAW by giving a
gender‐sensitive interpretation of human rights. It details several strategic objectives and
recommendations for government action in order to implement these objectives. It is housed
under and used by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women (U.N. Women) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).
12 See World Health Organization 2012. The World Health Organization's “fact sheet” on FGM states
that “FGM is recognized internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women,”
reflecting “deep‐rooted inequality between the sexes constituting an extreme form of
discrimination against women” that violates their rights. Another U.N. publication (United
Nations 2012) explains the cultural roots of FGM in several tribal populations living in Kenya,
and then advocates in favor of the international response, which recognizes FGM as “a violation
of the fundamental human rights of girls and women.” In 2008, the United Nations designated
February 8 as “International Day of Zero Tolerance of FGM.”
13 Maasai who were asked why the spiritual and educational aspect of FGM ceremonies could not be
isolated from the physical cutting are reported as responding with “a seemingly unchallengeable
argument: ‘It is our tradition—we must follow our culture'” (United Nations 2005).
14 Indeed, labeling them as “mutilation” is obviously a thick interpretation.
15 This invitation to imagine is encouraged through appeals to emotion—for example, using morally
charged language such as “mutilation” and provocative imagery to promote disgust,
compassion, and anger. Sometimes media are used to assist people in this imaginative feat by
providing videos that show these practices or reenactments of them in which young girls are
heard screaming in pain or crying uncontrollably. See Walker and Parmar 1993. See also United
Nations 2012, which provides links to a documentary bearing the name of the report, “Razor's
Edge,” and uses visual and auditory means to facilitate the imaginative feat.
16 Formal colonization was initiated in 1921, but the British began forcibly removing Maasai from their
land c. 1904 and again in 1911.
17 Hodgson's account does not romanticize or oversimplify the role of Maasai men in this process.
Opportunistic Maasai took advantage of colonial policies in order to strengthen their political
and economic power over both other lower‐status men and women (1999, 64–65). Uma
Narayan (1997, 81–118) makes a similar point regarding disputes over the moral status of sati
and dowry‐related deaths in India. Through careful historical analysis (in particular, through a
frame of colonial history), Narayan shows how the practice of sati becomes an Indian “tradition”
through struggles for power between some Indian men and British colonial authorities.
18 One way to characterize the contrast between the two reasoning practices is that whereas DAU
makes the picture (that is, a particular instance of FGC) fit a preset frame, EIRE tailors the frame
to fit a picture of the practice that comes into clearer focus with attention to more contextual
details.

19 For example, it is at least arguable that other genital cuttings such as male circumcision deserve
comparable moral attention, or that other issues such as “acid scarring,” where acid is thrown
on women's faces to disfigure them for life, deserve at least equally wide‐scale global opposition
campaigns. But these practices are prevalent in countries with greater global power than Kenya
and Tanzania, and so it is at least arguable that they get less moral attention because the places
where they occur are more impervious to moral scrutiny.
20 Interestingly, the reasoning strategies used by scholars and activists to develop the women's human
rights framework articulated in The Beijing Platform resembles empirically informed reflective
equilibrium. Human rights were taken as important moral standards but then interpreted in
light of the specific moral experiences of women in a variety of cultural contexts, revealing a
need to radically reconceptualize rights in order to address women's rights violations. Yet once
WHR had received relatively secure status as a set of internationally recognized moral
standards, it became easy for members of more powerful global communities to revert to
deductive application of these standards. In some circumstances this might be an appropriate
reasoning strategy, but in general when moral disputes involve interlocutors from former
colonial powers and contemporary global powers with histories of colonial interventions in
those regions, deductive application of rights standards is likely to be an inadequate justificatory
strategy because it is too susceptible to misuse by those with more global power.
21 The WHR approach has made visible gender power abuse across cultural and national contexts,
which had been systematically concealed by previous human rights frameworks, and to the
extent it has done this it has been successful.
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